This article analyzes the effect of implementing a per-visit copayment for medical services in Korea.
INTRODUCTION
Governments around the world are concerned about rising health care costs. In the 1980s, the Korean government introduced cost-sharing schemes that offered financial incentives for consumers to reduce their medical care use. A notable feature was the introduction in 1986 of a "per-visit" copayment for each contact with a medical care provider (clinic or hospital). The copayment was a fixed monetary amount, independent of the volume of services rendered in connection with the visit. The introduction of the per-visit copayment resulted in an increase in the price of a visit and provides a rare natural experiment in which we can examine the relation between cost sharing and use of medical care.
Various aspects of the relation between coinsurance and use of medical care are addressed in the Rand Health Insurance Experiment. Based on a randomized controlled trial, the study reveals that the coinsurance rate affects medical care demand most at 0-25 percent coinsurance but not as much beyond that level (Manning et al., 1987) . Before the per-visit copayment was introduced in Korea, the outpatient coinsurance rate was already above 25 percent. It would be interesting to examine whether a per-visit copayment was effective in reducing health care costs above the 25 percent coinsurance range, where copayment was not as effective in reducing medical use. 2 The Rand studies are limited to episodes of treatment (Keeler and Rolph, 1988) and predict annual medical spending (Manning et al., 1987) because the cost-sharing schemes used in the experiment do not generate financial incentives for patients to change visit rates or contents. The per-visit copayment introduced in Korea changed the patient's cost for a visit rather than for an episode. The regulatory change provided an opportunity to develop and test hypotheses on how per-visit cost sharing affects the behavior of health care consumers and providers. An analysis of this form of patient cost sharing should complement the Rand results.
This is the first study in which use of medical care is analyzed simultaneously according to visit level, treatment episode, and year. By disaggragated medical care use to the visit level, it is possible to uncover information about the behavior of consumers and providers, which would have been suppressed in the episode or annual level analyses. Also, exploring the financial incentives of an alternative insurance system provides some implication for designing copayments for primary care visits that most best-selling HMO packages require in the United States (Group Health Association of America, 1994) . Because HMOs are the most rapidly growing type of health insurance schemes in the U.S, analyzing the effect of a per-visit copayment can give some lessons to the HMO industry and provide an opportunity for future international comparisons.
This article analyzes the impact of the per-visit copayment on the Korean health insurance system. I briefly introduce the theoretical models, predict how medical use and expenditure will change, and describe the data construction and sample characteristics. Then, I examine the effect of introducing the copayment using regressions. Changes in use of medical and dental care per year, episode, and visits are analyzed. How total health care expenditures and total insurer expenses changed after the copayment act is also presented. The conclusion discusses policy implications.
Korean Health Insurance System 3
Under Korea's national health insurance program, all health care providers within each type of medical institution are reimbursed the same amount as set by the uniform fee schedule for an insured service, regardless of the provider's 2 The average coinsurance rates for outpatient services provided by general hospitals, hospitals, or clinics are presented in Table 1 . 3 This section describes the Korean health insurance system of the 1980s. In the 1990s the government changed the title of the ministry and the number of health insurance societies.
reputation or location. The three types of medical institutions in Korea are: general hospital, hospital, and clinic. General hospitals include teaching and special hospitals (e.g., children's hospitals). Hospitals resemble the community hospitals in the United States. Clinics are Korea's equivalent to physicians' offices in the United States. Physicians have criticized the uniform fees for being set too low, arguing they must see at least 100 patients a day to break even. Hence, three minutes consultations are common in Korea, during which patients can hardly express their concerns or question their doctors (Kyung Hee Medical Center 1988) . In the 1980s, five entities interacted in the Korean system: The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MOSHA) determines the fee schedule and other insurance regulations. It also provides subsidies for insolvent insurance societies. Korea's 313 health insurance societies (HIS) collect premiums and process for claims. Among the 313 insurance societies, 140 societies serve employee groups and 173 societies serve for the rest of the population who are mainly selfemployedThe National Federation for Health Insurance (NFHI), which enforces MOSHA regulations, resembles a giant insurance company that controls the insurance societies, evaluates claims, and determines what amount it will reimburse for each claim. Each insured person receives an insurance card from an HIS and is responsible for paying the premiums. The insurance card entitles the person to medical treatment at either a clinic or a hospital, with copayment expected at the time of the visit. Most health care providers are based in the private sector. All health care providers file their claims through an HIS, which reports the claims to NFHI. Once NFHI determines the amount of reimbursement, the HIS reimburses the providers.
Copayment Act
In 1986, the Korean government introduced the country's first per-visit copayment system, which was applied to outpatient and dental services. Before 1986, the cost sharing was based solely on coinsurance rates, which for outpatient and dental service in clinics was 30 percent, in hospitals was 50 percent, and in general hospitals was 55 percent. The inpatient coinsurance rate did not change in 1986, remaining at 20 percent for all types of medical institutions.
The per-visit copayment is similar to the entry fee of a two-part tariff system. Whenever insured persons seek outpatient and dental services from medical institutions, they are required to pay an entry fee, which is the physician's consultation fee. In other words, patients must pay the per visit copayment every time they visit medical institutions. The cost sharing per visit differs across the three types of medical institutions.
The fixed fee is determined by the Minister of Health and Social Affairs and differs between the treatment types (i.e., outpatient or dental). The average fixed fee was US $4.30.
Consultation fees charged by hospitals and general hospitals vary slightly. The average consultation fee for hospitals and general hospitals was U.S. $5.40 (Moon, 1990) . 4 The copayment system resulted in higher out-of-pocket expenses for outpatient services (See Table 1 The 1986 Copayment Act arose to curb (Table 1) rapidly increasing medical care utilization and a growing trend of insured persons bypassing clinics in favor of hospital and general hospital outpatient services, whose quality of care was considered superior and whose medical fees were higher than clinics. 6 To correct this problem, the government developed a copayment system. To restrict the use of advanced medical institutions more so than clinics, the per-visit copayment for outpatient services was set higher for hospitals than for clinics. The 1986 Copayment Act also sought to improve administrative efficiency in clinics. Some clinic administrators did not clearly understand the complex insurance reimbursement systems and, according to government audits, did not report claims as accurately as large hospitals. To improve the administrative 4 The average annual income was US $14,050 for the urban corporate insurance sample used in this study. 5 The average annual income was US $14,050 for the urban corporate insurance sample used in this study. 6 In 1986, the fees for general hospitals were set 20 percent higher than basic fees. Hospital fees were set 10 percent higher than basic fees. (Moon, 1990 (Rho, 1989) . The 1986 Act was implemented to relieve the financial distress of insurance societies through increased cost sharing.
THEORETICAL MODELS
In consideration of space, a summary of the theoretical models that generate the study's empirical hypotheses is given in this section. The full derivation of the models is provided in Jung (1992) .
Demand for Medical Visits
We do not know the extent to which a patient can choose the quantity of medical services after the initial visit. Considering that in Korea a physician has full discretion over the service intensity per visit and a patient can but follow the physician's order made during the short consultation, it may not be reasonable to consider a medical service as the unit of medical care demand. The quantity of medical services per illness episode is composed of the number of visits and the service intensity per visit. The patient has more discretion over the number of visits than over service intensity, because compliance with the physician's order on follow-up visits is entirely up to the patient. If we think of the unit of demand curve as the unit over which the consumer has the greatest control, it is more reasonable to consider the medical visit as the unit of demand for medical care.
Suppose only one type of disease exists, and that it occurs at most once to a patient during one period of time. The health stock is assumed to be produced by purchasing medical care visits. Health status is, therefore, determined by the initial stock of health, random loss of health such as illness and accident, and the health production by purchasing medical visits. The major assumption of this article is that a patient chooses whether to visit the provider or not and, in so doing, also chooses the number of visits. The physician determines intensity per visit and, in so doing considers its impact on his or her income as well as the anticipated 7 A low-value case is defined as having a total charge less than or equal to Korean Won 10,000 (US $14.28). The exchange rate used for the analysis is one US Dollar equals 700 Korean Won. patient's decision on visits. In other words, the physician knows that the patient can choose different providers and the number of visits if the physician offers service intensity significantly different from the patient's preference.
Decision Process
The interaction between patient and physician is modeled using the Stackelberg game. Under the assumptions of perfect information, the decision process can be explained as follows. In stage 1, the physician determines the intensity per visit. In stage 2, the patient decides the number of visits given the intensity per visit.
The patient maximizes the utility function: The physician's indifference curve and patient's response line are illustrated in figure 1 . 8 As the per-visit copayment was introduced, the marginal cost of a doctor visit relative to the marginal cost of intensity changed. Hence, the patient's response curve becomes flatter (R 1 R 1 '), which implies that the patient now prefers more intensity and fewer visits. Because the patient's budget constraint I changed, the response curve R 1 shifts down to R 2 . By the same token, the physician's indifference curve I 1 shifts downward and becomes flatter (I 2 ). The changes in the physician's NY indifference curve is driven by the assumption that the physician 8 The graphical illustration is limited in some aspects. It cannot show that the physician can increase the intensity per visit to a certain level but not beyond that.
cares about the patient's preference on visit intensity. With these changes in the physician's indifference curve and the patient's response curve, the graph clearly indicates that the number of visits will fall and the intensity per visit will rise after the per-visit copayment is introduced (E 1 E 2 ).
Hypotheses
1. The introduction of a copayment will reduce the number of doctor visits within an illness episode.
2. The introduction of a copayment will increase the intensity per visit.
3. Conditional annual spending given any use of medical care during the year will not necessarily be reduced by the copayment, because the models predict that the number of visits and intensity per visit will move in opposite directions. 
PREDICTION ON MEDICAL USE AND EXPENDITURE

Modification of the Rand Two-Part Model
The three hypotheses indicate that when the copayment is raised, visits per illness episode will fall but intensity per visit will rise. We can accordingly posit that the 1986 Copayment Act changed financial incentives regarding per-visit medical care. Therefore, the empirical analysis should also start at the level of medical care use per visit. This simple prediction at the visit level provides a reasonable conjecture on the changes in utilization of medical care per illness episode and annual use of medical care after the copayment. Based on the conjecture, it is possible to answer the ultimate question: How will the introduction of the copayment affect annual spending for medical care?
The two-part model developed by Manning, et al., (1980) assumes that expected annual spending for medical care is the product of illness frequency and illness episode expense. Using the two-part model, Manning and colleagues focus on episode utilization. I modify their two-part model to represent all three levels of medical care use: medical care use per year, per illness, per episode, and per visit. I assume that expected annual health care spending equal the probability of any medical care during the year times the conditional annual spending given any medical use. 9 The conditional annual spending may be further decomposed using the episode utilization data. Given any medical care use the conditional annual spending is estimated as the illness episode frequency during the year time expense per the episode. Conditional episode expense is disaggregated as the product of the visit rates within an illness episode and average medical care cost per visit (service intensity per visit). Unlike the Rand model, the illness episode frequency during the year and the annual health care spending in the two-part model are conditional on any medical care use and, therefore, are estimated using the conditional annual utilization data, which exclude observations with zero medical use. For each type of care (outpatient, dental, and inpatient), the modified two-part model can be written as follows: 
Components of Medical Expenditure and Their Effects
To predict the direction of the change in expected annual spending for medical care after the implementation of the copayment, it is necessary to conjecture about how the implementation of the copayment will change the five components of the expected annual spending discussed above. The analysis of the probability of any use (PROB) and conditional annual episode frequencies (EPI) provides clues on how the copayment affects a patient's decision over whether to initiate an episode of medical care. The conditional "episode" expense will vary depending on the extent of substitution between visits and service intensity per visit, assuming there is no income effect from the introduction of the copayment.
10 If intensity per visit (RVE) perfectly substitutes 9 In the Rand two-part model, the effect of cost sharing on the illness episode frequencies is "unconditional." Unconditional episode frequency includes effects on both probability of medical care use and "conditional" episode frequency. 10 It is reasonable to assume negligible income effects, because the deductible was less than 0.4 percent of the average income.
for number of visits (TDAY), the conditional episode expense will not change after the copayment is introduced. If RVE does not perfectly substitute for TDAY, the conditional episode expense will fall. Considering that health care service intensity cannot always offset the decreased number of doctor visits, I conjecture that the conditional episode expense is more likely to fall after the copayment is introduced The final question to be answered is, "Did the introduction of the per-visit copayment contain total health care expenditures as well as total insurer expenses?" Holding the occurrence of illness constant, the expected annual spending on medical care will change following the dynamics of the tradeoff between visit rates and service intensity and the reduction in initial visits, alternatively, illness episode frequency and probability of medical care use. The per-visit copayment will be effective for cost containment if the decrease in doctor visits and illness episode frequencies is significant and cannot completely be offset by the increase in service intensity per visit.
DATA AND SAMPLE
The sample was randomly selected among the employees of large companies who had been covered by the Employee Insurance Program during the period 1984 through 1988. The sample includes 10,170 employees who made 87,952 claims during the five years. Three types of comprehensive data sets (illness episode utilization of medical care, annual utilization of medical care, and total expenditure) were constructed for the empirical analysis. The episode utilization data were constructed by merging the claims file and the eligibility file based on the employee's identification number. The unit of analysis is episode-individual.
The definition of episode of treatment is similar to Keeler and Rolph's (1987) definition. All the expenses associated with a given bout of illness are grouped into one episode. The National Federation for Health Insurance constructs each claims record based on the concept of episode of treatment. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MOHSA) annually collects and verifies the data from individual insurance societies. The claims data base provides information about the diagnosis code (ICD 9 code), beginning date of illness episode, date claims were filed, treatment type (whether the episode was outpatient, dental, or inpatient care), visit rates within an episode, number of medication days per episode, total processed spending per episode, processed insurer payment, and processed copayment.
The eligibility data base contains demographic and economic information about each insured employee such as age, sex, income, insurance contribution rate, family size, family relationship, job status in the company, and date the person became insured. Because these factors do not significantly change over time, the 1988 file is used. The only information in the file subject to inflation is income. Income is, therefore, deflated by the consumer price index of each year.
The annual utilization data set is constructed as follows. The illness episode utilization data are divided into three groups according to the treatment type (outpatient, dental, and inpatient care). For each treatment type, all episodes that occurred for each person within a given year are then aggregated. For each type of treatment the annual utilization data provide information about total number of visits per year, total number of medication days per year, total medical care spending per year, and number of illness episodes per year. The unit of observation is year-individual.
To examine the effect of the Copayment Act on cost containment, the total expenditure data set is constructed in the same way as the annual expenditure data, except all expenditures for outpatient, dental, and inpatient care are aggregated. The unit of observation is individual-year.
For descriptive analysis, data for all five-year sets are used. For multivariate analysis, however, only the observations for 1985 and 1986 are used to examine shock effects of the copayment.
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Sample Characteristics
The average age of the sample population of employees is 35 years, with a range of 22 to 54 years of age, and they have an average monthly income of Korean won 816,833 (US $1,170, annual income $14,050) in 1988. The majority of employees (66 percent) were aged 30 to 39 years. The average family size was four. The cross tabulations of age and income as well as job status reflect the seniority system of Korean companies, in which older employees earn higher wages and assume executive roles. In the sample, 99 percent were men. Technicians and skilled laborers occupy 83 percent of the sample. Employees in the sample have very low turnover rates because about 85 percent of all employees have been employed more than 15 years. Lifetime employment is characteristic of large Korean companies. Another feature of stable employment, years insured with the company, shows that employees have been insured for 12 years on average.
The total number of medical episodes for employees during the period 1984 through 1988 was 87,952, of which 88 percent were outpatient, 10.4 percent were dental, and 1.4 percent were inpatient. Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of various episode utilization measures for outpatient, dental, and inpatient care. The average number of outpatient visits per illness episode is 2.8. Medication days per illness episode range from an average of 5.1 for outpatient care to 2.3 for dental care. The distribution in the number of visits per episode for outpatient care is more dispersed and more skewed to the right than that for dental care. One to three visits per episode accounts for 77.5 percent of the outpatient episodes and 86 percent of the dental episodes.
The prevailing number of medication days is also 3 or lowers (77.5 percent of outpatient episodes, 86 percent of dental episodes).
11 One reason for using only the two-year data is that T-statistics for regression coefficients would be upward biased by regressing the same covariates for an individual five times if the five-year pooled crosssection was used. Also, the change in medical care utilization will also reflect supplier response as well as demand when five-year data are used. It is reasonable to argue that there would be a much smaller supplier response in the first year the deductible was introduced. 
Advantage of the Sample
The greatest advantage of the sample, in contrast to other nonexperimental studies of the effect of user prices on the quantity of medical care demanded, is that there is no selection bias of the insured population. Selection bias, in which sicker people tend to choose more complete coverage, is often suspected in many empirical studies in the U.S. literature. Its existence causes the estimated effect of copayment on utilization to be overstated. The compulsory nature of health insurance in Korea and the employment stability of the sample relieve concern about selection bias in estimating the effects of changes in patient's cost on medical care utilization.
An added advantage is that per-visit response to a change in copayment can be examined using the data. As discussed above, the sample consists mostly of middle-income young employees, which is analogous to the sample characteristics of many HMOs in the United States. Exploring the financial incentives of an alternative insurance system provides some implication for designing copayments for primary care visits that most U.S. HMO packages require (Group Health Association of America, 1994) . Since HMOs are the most rapidly growing type of health insurance scheme in the U.S., analyzing the effect of per-visit copayment can give some lessons to the HMO industry and provide an opportunity for future international comparisons. Three variables examine the effect of the Copayment Act on cost containment: probability of using any type of medical care (PROB1), conditional total annual expenditure (LTYTE), and conditional insurer expenditure per year (LITE). Any type of medical care includes outpatient, dental and inpatient care. LYTE is, therefore, the logarithmic sum of outpatient, dental, and inpatient expenditure for the year.
Dependent Variables
Explanatory Variables
Three types of explanatory variables are used for the regression models: demographic factors (age, family size, income, and education), the insurance variable (YRDUMMY), and an individual heterogeneity variable.
Demographic factors
Gender is excluded because 99 percent of the sample are men. As shown in Table  2 , age and income are log-transformed. Since family size does not show large variation in the sample, family size is not log-transformed. Job status is a proxy for education. The education dummy variable is defined as zero if the employee is not a factory worker (which means a college graduate) and one if a factory worker (which means a high school graduate).
Impact of the copayment ( YRDUMMY).
To analyze how the introduction of the copayment affected health care use, I use the year dummy variable. The year dummy variable is defined as zero if the observation occurred before the copayment was introduced (1984 through 1985) and one if the observation occurred after the copayment (1986 through 1998).
Individual heterogeneity (individual).
Controlling each individual's heterogeneous response to the implementation of the copayment is necessary to separate the effect of copayment from each person's behavior. Otherwise, the coefficients of the year dummy variable would include the copayment effect as well as each person's heterogeneous response. For each regression, the mean of each dependent variable in year i is included as the value for using log-transformed dependent variables.
for the individual heterogeneity variable in year i+1. If an individual has two outpatient episodes with two and four visits in 1984, the value for individual heterogeneity variable in 1985 will be three for the regression on visit number (LTDAY).
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Regression Model Specification
For the first part of the model uses, a logistic regression (McFadden, 1974) . Based on various specification tests and comparisons of various models, the ordinary least squares with log-transformed annual expenditure (LYTE) is used for the second part of the model. 13 I modify the two-part model by decomposing the log conditional annual expense (LYTE) into three components: LEPI, LTDAY, and LRVE. The disaggregation makes the visit-level analysis feasible. 14 To reduce the bias from repeated observation on the same person, I construct the individual heterogeneity variable as follows. For each regression, the value of the individual heterogeneity variable for observations 1985 is the mean of each individual's 1984 health care utilization. The value of the variable for 1986 observations is calculated similarly using the individual's healthcare utilization for1985. A noteworthy characteristic of Korean medical spending is that reimbursement for prescription drugs accounts for about 32 percent of total medical insurance reimbursement (National Federation of Medical Insurance 1988), an amount higher than that of other most nations. I, therefore, include the results about changes in medication days (LMDAY) in the analysis. In sum, the modified two-part model first describes the probability of medical use and then annual expenditure, which was further decomposed into LEPI, LTDAY, LRVE, and LMDAY. 13 For the details of model specification, see the Specification Tests section in Jung (1992) . 14 The theoretical assumptions of a physician's full discretion over the intensity of the visit and a patient's discretion over the visit rates are well represented by the second part of the empirical model, in which the changes in visit rates and intensity per visit are independently estimated. 15 For the details of model specification, see the Specification Tests section in Jung (1992) . 16 The theoretical assumptions of a physician's full discretion over the intensity of the visit and a patient's discretion over the visit rates are well represented by the second part of the empirical model, in which the changes in visit rates and intensity per visit are independently estimated. 
Methods of Predicting Total Medical Care Expenditure
Once parameters of the regressions are estimated, we can also determine the expected total annual spending (ETYTE) and expected annual insurer spending (EITE). To estimate LTYTE and LITE, values of covariates for each observation are multiplied by the estimated regression coefficients. The value of probability for each individual is calculated in the same way. To retransform the expected LTYTE and LITE from logarithmic units back to natural units, I use Duan's smearing estimator (1983) . By multiplying estimated probability (PROB) by retransformed TYTE and ITE, expected total annual expenditure (ETYTE) and expected insurer expenditure (EITE) for each individual are calculated. Finally, the means of ETYTE and EITE are calculated. Table 4 presents the regression results of the two-part model for outpatient utilization. The first two columns show the results of the first and second part of the two-part model, the probability of any outpatient use and the conditional annual spending. The other four columns present the results on the three components of the conditional spending (conditional annual episode frequencies, visit rates per episode, and intensity per visit) and the medication days.
RESULTS
Outpatient Medical Care utilization
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The introduction of the copayment significantly reduced the probability of any outpatient medical care use but did not significantly affect the conditional annual spending for outpatient medical care. The small change in the conditional annual spending implies that the decreases in visit rates within an illness episode and medication days were offset by the increase in intensity per episode, given any outpatient medical care during the year (Table 4) .
Among the three components of conditional annual spending, the conditional illness episode frequency did not change after implementation of the copayment. Most importantly, outpatient episode utilization reveals declines in visit rates per episode (8.4 percent) and number of medication days (3.5 percent), but an increase in intensity per visit within an episode (9.8 percent) after implementation of the copayment in 1986 when compared with 1985 rates (see coefficients for YRDUMMY in Table 4 ). These findings are consistent with hypotheses one and two, that the change in patient's costs affected providers' decisions on service intensity as well as patients' decisions on number of visits. The effects of the copayment system can be regarded as the change in outpatient medical care utilization through reduced the number of visits, medication days, and probability of outpatient use. Physicians seemed to respond to reduced the number of visits by increasing the intensity per visit. Under the assumption of constant occurrence of illnesses, the implementation of the copayment affected the probability of any outpatient use more than conditional annual episode frequencies. The individual heterogeneity variable is statistically significant in all six regressions. It is positively associated with outpatient utilization measures except intensity per visit (LRVE). People in this sample had consistent use of outpatient medical care, which is in accord with Grossman's (1972) theory. 19 The individual heterogeneity variable could be regarded as a proxy for the omitted variables of health status and individual tendencies to initiate medical visits. Even if the sample does not include the elderly (aged 65 and older), older employees tend to initiate a medical episode more frequently than younger ones. As shown in Table 4 , age is positively associated with five measures of outpatient 18 As explained in the model specification section, the medication day (LMDAY) is included in the analysis because pharmaceutical reimbursement accounts for 32 percent of the total insurance reimbursement in Korea. 19 According to Grossman, it would be reasonable to assume that an individual is given a certain level of health stock and improves or reduces it by health habits peculiar to each person. And individual tendencies to initiate a medical visit differs across individuals. These two factors would be major components of individual factors that affect medical use.
health care utilization. The coefficients for age are statistically significant in explaining the probability of any medical care and annual illness episode frequencies (LEPI). As indicated by the coefficients for LINC in the last two columns of Table 4 , high-income employees receive more intensive care per visit and have more medication days. This implies, together with the negative income coefficient in the LTDAY equation, that executives who earn higher wages have fewer doctor visits per illness episode but more intensive care and more medication days. 20 The coefficients for the education dummy variable (EDU) in the LTDAY and LMDAY equations indicate that high school graduates, factory workers in most cases, have longer visits and more medication days than college graduates, white collar workers. Family size is negatively associated with medication days.
Dental Care Utilization
The pattern of changes in annual dental care utilization differ from outpatient medical care utilization. Unlike outpatient medical care, both the probability of any dental care and the conditional annual spending on dental care dropped in 1986 relative to 1985 (Table 5) . 21 The dental episode frequency did not change in 1986. Dental visit rates and medication days declined 25 percent and 20.8 percent, respectively, but intensity per visit surged 19 percent during the period (see coefficients for YRDUMMY in Table 5 ).
The implementation of the copayment was more effective in containing dental care utilization than outpatient medical care utilization; the magnitude of the reduction in dental care was about four times that of outpatient utilization. The 11 percent drop in the conditional annual spending for dental care implies that the decrease in dental visit rates and medication days exceeded the increase in intensity of care. The effects of the copayment on dental care utilization can be summarized as decreases in visits, medication days, probability of use, and conditional annual spending.
Contrary to the outpatient health care utilization, the individual heterogeneity variable is not significantly associated with any of six dental utilization measures. This reveals the characteristics of dental care that it is more easily postponed and occurs less frequently than outpatient care. The average of the previous year's dental care might not be sufficient to capture each person's trend of dental care None of the demographic factors except age affect dental care utilization. Older employees are more likely to seek dental care and to have more frequent dental episodes. The dental care per visit was less intensive for older employees. 20 I also ran interaction models for the six utilization measures to examine how different income groups as well as different age cohorts were affected by the introduction of the deductible. The results imply that neither variable reacted differently except for outpatient medication days. The sample characteristics of the employees might reasonably explain such insignificant interaction effects. The sample does not include the low-income or the very old population. Without these groups, it might be reasonable to expect no interaction effects in a somewhat homogenous sample of employees. 21 The drop in probability of dental use was statistically significant at p value .07. 
Total Health Care Spending
To examine the difference in total health care spending between the pre and postcopayment periods, two types of comparisons are made. The short-term comparison uses observations for 1985 and 1986, whereas the long-term comparison uses observations for 1984 through 1988. Since both comparisons show similar results, the discussion is based on the short-term comparison.
The implementation of the per-visit copayment reduced both expected total annual expenditures (ETYTE) and expected insurer reimbursement (ETIE). The reduction in ETYTE was not caused by conditional total expenditures but by the decrease in the probability of any health care use (Table 6 ). Unlike ETYTE, the decline in expected insurer reimbursement is attributable to both components. episodes might be attributable to randomness of illness. Alternatively, inpatient episodes may have substituted for outpatient episodes.
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Inpatient Medical Care Utilization
Among the inpatient annual utilization measures, only illness episode frequency per year rose 6% percent in 1986 relative to 1985. The increase in inpatient illness
Total Health Care Spending
To examine the difference in total health care spending between the pre and postcopayment periods, two types of comparisons are made. The short-term comparison uses observations for 1985 and 1986, whereas the long-term comparison uses observations for 1984 through 1988. Since both comparisons show similar results, the discussion is based on the short-term comparison
The implementation of the per-visit copayment reduced both expected total annual expenditures (ETYTE) and expected insurer reimbursement (ETIE). The reduction in ETYTE was not caused by conditional total expenditures but by the decrease in the probability of any health care use (Table 6 ). Unlike ETYTE, the decline in expected insurer reimbursement is attributable to both components. When the per-capita medical expenditure fell, ITE which is a certain percentage of the medical expenditure also falls. Through the per-visit copayment, the cost sharing borne by the insured person increases, which means that insurer expenditure decreased. The percentage of decrease in ITE is, therefore, larger than that in TYTE (Table 7) .
The estimated coefficiencients for the PROB, ITE, and TYTE variables are presented in Table 7 . The estimated probability of any medical use (PROB) was 0.69 in 1985 and fell 6.9 percent to 0.66 in 1986. Whereas the conditional total spending by an individual (TYTE) declined only one percent after the Copayment Act, the conditional annual insurer reimbursement (ITE) decreased 9.7 percent in the same period. Following implementation of the copayment, expected total spending per person fell 4.7 percent to Won 37,570 (US $54), and expected annual insurer expenses per person dropped 12.8 percent to Won 25,864 (US $37). 
Discussion of the Results
The copayment system changed the patterns for outpatient medical care and dental care utilization. Both outpatient and dental care showed decreases in probability of use as well as visit rates within an illness episode. The magnitude of the decrease in doctor visits is greater in dental care than in outpatient care, and vise versa for the probability of use. Service intensity per visit rose after the copayment was introduced, which can be interpreted as evidence consistent with hypothesis two on physician behavior. The change in patient's costs does affect a physician's behavior. However, the interpretation is limited to the extent that the per-visit copayment censored out mildly sick patients. For example, after the copayment was implemented, some of the patients have might postponed seeing a doctor and thereby became sicker by the time they finally initiated a medical visit. Dental care showed lower conditional annual spending after introduction of the copayment, which highlights the basic differences between demand for medical care and demand for dental care. In general, dental care is more easily postponed, and, therefore, the per-visit copayment would be effective in reducing dental visits more than medical visits. 24 The lower conditional annual spending means that increased intensity per dental visit was not enough to offset the decline in visit rates. Another possible explanation is associated with the difference in the extent of dental coverage and outpatient coverage. Because dental coverage in Korea is much less complete than outpatient coverage, the increase in intensity per visit could have come out-of-pocket from patients rather than from insurers. If this is the case, the insurance claims data for dental care will not convey perfect information about intensity per visit. The difference in the extent of coverage between outpatient and dental care could also explain the other interesting result that outpatient care shows higher income elasticities in medication days and intensity per visit than dental care. Once they have dental diseases, rich and poor alike would demand more than the basic dental services covered. Hence, the insured dental services would show very low-income elasticities. But I presume the income elasticities of uncovered dental services would be much larger. On the other hand, a wider range of outpatient services are covered. Holding other things constant, the person with a higher income would demand more insured outpatient services than the lower-income person. Therefore, income elasticities of insured outpatient services would be higher than those of insured dental services.
The results that the implementation of the copayment reduces the probability of any medical care use but did not affect conditional annual illness episode frequencies means that the copayment effectively suppresses the initiation of an episode to zero but not among those who require at least one episode after the copayment. Among the sample analyzed, more people had one episode that was suppressed to zero by the copayment than people who had more than one episode that was reduced to at least one episode did. In other words, those who were influenced by the copayment simply did not initiate any episode, which is captured by the probability of use.
The finding that white collar employees have fewer visits but more intensive care than factory workers can be interpreted as follows. White-collar workers' absence affects a company's overall management, whereas blue-collar workers' absence affects their own departments. Also, other technicians can carry out technical jobs, which is not the case for management decisions. Executives would, therefore, be less likely than technicians to miss a workday to see a physician.
After the per-visit copayment, total annual medical expenditure per person fell 4.7 percent to Won 37,570 (US $ 54). The decrease is mainly attributable to the reduction in the first visit (probability of use). The reduction in insurers' expected reimbursement is considerably higher than that of total annual spending, and contributed to relieving the financial distress of many insurance societies as planned. 24 Dental services showed greater responsiveness to coinsurance than other medical services in the first year when the Rand health insurance plan was implemented (Manning et al. 1985) . Also having dental coverage increased the likelihood of dental use by 15-21 percent (Mueller et al. 1988 ).
Limitations
The assumption that nothing else changed in 1986 except for the introduction of the copayment and the interpretation of the coefficient of the year dummy variable as the single effect of the copayment overstates the effects of the copayment on outpatient and dental care utilization. In other words, the coefficient for the year dummy variable catches the effect of the copayment as well as other random events such as occurrence of influenza. The change in utilization could also reflect elements of supply, especially in the long-term comparison. In addition, because of the unavailability of a control group, which is a dilemma for studies that analyze the effect of nationwide policy changes, most parts of the discussion are based on the short-term comparison (1985 vs. 1986) , where supply responses and trend effects would be minimal.
The T-statistics for the coefficients in the regression on the utilization of health care per illness episode are upward biased because visit rates within an episode for a given person are regressed against the same independent variables as many times as the number of episodes occurred for that person during the analysis period.
CONCLUSION
This study analyzes the effect of implementing the per-visit copayment on medical use and spending. Investigating the impact of a "visit level" cost sharing (which is not examined by the Rand study) has great relevance for the U.S. health insurance system, as most HMOs require copayment for primary care visits.
The introduction of the per-visit copayment was effective in changing the pattern for medical care utilization and did contain medical cost inflation. The most remarkable changes after the copayment are the decrease the number of doctor visits and in the probability of seeking medical care, and the increase in intensity per visit. With regard to the decreased medical contacts in the higher cost sharing plan, my study is consistent with the Rand's findings that the likelihood of receiving any medical care accounts for three-fifths of the overall response to cost sharing (Manning, et. al., 1987) . The decreased medical contacts are mainly attributable to the drop in probability of use and medical visits within an episode rather than illness episode frequencies.
My interpretation of the unremarkable change in the intensity of outpatient illness episodes is different from the Rand study. The unchanged intensity per episode does not necessarily mean that cost sharing did not affect a physician's decision on intensity of care. Decomposing the cost per episode, I find that cost per outpatient illness episode does not change because the increase in visit intensity completely offsets the decrease in visit rates.
In designing a copayment scheme for primary visits to HMOs, it would be erroneous to assume that cost sharing does not generally affect a provider's decision on treatment of an illness. The increased intensity per visit might be caused by a change in physician behavior or patients' delay in initiating medical visits, or both, which in turn could increase medical expenditure.
